Foreign Language Education Planning in China Since 1949: A Recurrent Instrumentalist Discourse by Liu, Yeting
Working Papers in Educational
Linguistics (WPEL)
Volume 30
Number 1 Spring 2015 Article 4
4-1-2015
Foreign Language Education Planning in China
Since 1949: A Recurrent Instrumentalist Discourse
Yeting Liu
University of Pennsylvania
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wpel/vol30/iss1/4
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Foreign Language Education Planning in China Since 1949: A Recurrent
Instrumentalist Discourse
Abstract
Foreign language education planning (FLEP) has been caught in the political turmoil and hustle of ongoing
economic reform in the People’s Republic of China for several decades. This paper situates a recurring
instrumentalist discourse of FLEP in China in the underlying language ideologies and historical contexts from
1949 to present day. Utilizing Cooper’s (1989) guiding question of “who makes what decisions, why, how,
under what conditions, and with what effect?” (p. 88), this paper examines the decision-making process in
language planning across several decades. A discussion of the repercussions of this instrumentalist approach to
FLEP in different time periods in China calls attention to the difference and significance between treating
language as a tool and as a resource (Ruíz, 1984, 2010).
This article is available in Working Papers in Educational Linguistics (WPEL): http://repository.upenn.edu/wpel/vol30/iss1/4
Foreign Language Education Planning in 
China Since 1949:  
A Recurrent Instrumentalist Discourse
Yeting Liu
University of Pennsylvania
Foreign language education planning (FLEP) has been caught in the political 
turmoil and hustle of ongoing economic reform in the People’s Republic of China 
for several decades. This paper situates a recurring instrumentalist discourse of 
FLEP in China in the underlying language ideologies and historical contexts from 
1949 to present day. Utilizing Cooper’s (1989) guiding question of “who makes 
what decisions, why, how, under what conditions, and with what effect?” (p. 88), 
this paper examines the decision-making process in language planning across 
several decades. A discussion of the repercussions of this instrumentalist approach 
to FLEP in different time periods in China calls attention to the difference and 
significance between treating language as a tool and as a resource (Ruíz, 1984, 2010).
Over the past six decades since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),1 the imperative of modernization as well as the maintenance of the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party (CCP) have shaped a new 
sociopolitical environment that has given rise to the expansion of foreign language 
education, which is a relatively new component of education in China (Fu, 1986). 
The historical development of foreign language education planning (FLEP) in the 
PRC is profoundly influenced by China’s previous and current interactions with 
foreign countries as well as by language ideologies that are commonly observed 
in other countries. 
It was not until the second half of the 19th century, when the feudalist Qing 
government in China was bullied by Western imperial powers, that the government 
started to embrace the modern idea of diplomacy and was forced to open up to more 
interaction with foreign cultures (Zhang & Xu, 2007). Under these circumstances, the 
reformists in the government initiated a self-strengthening movement despite the 
resistance from the conservatives who were afriad of cultural infiltration. Resources 
were deployed to raise foreign language skills so that China could access modern 
science and technology required for producing firearms or ships to defend its 
sovereignty (Li, Zhang, & Liu, 1988). One of the leading reformists, Zhang Zhidong, 
proposed the idea of “Chinese learning/values for foundational principles, Western 
learning for practical uses” (中学为体, 西学为用)2 (Zhang, 1898) in order to ease the 
1  PRC refers to China from 1949 to the present when it is under the governance of the CCP only. China 
is used interchangeably with PRC during this period in this paper. When talking about other historical 
periods during which China was not yet the PRC, China and more specific description are used.
2  All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
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conflicts between reformists, who advocated emulating western industrialization, 
and conservatives, who feared the loss of Chinese language and values. The role 
and status of foreign languages were cautiously defined assuming that languages 
could be acquired as technical tools detached from their cultural connotations. 
This idea also alluded to the potentially rival ideologies embedded in Chinese and 
foreign languages, which reflected the relationship between feudalist China and 
industrialized western countries at that time.
This language-as-tool discourse (Ruíz, 2010), which I will term an 
instrumentalist view, is not unique to the Qing Dynasty. In fact, the wax and 
wane of this instrumentalist view of foreign languages and the fear of cultural 
infiltration manifested in China’s FLEP have accompanied the demise and 
formation of different governments up to the 21st century. By tracing changes in 
FLEP from 1949 to present day, this paper examines the sociopolitical contexts 
and language ideologies that have given rise to different manifestations of the 
instrumentalist orientation to FLEP in China. Specifically, I explore the extent to 
which an instrumentalist orientation to FLEP might seem inevitable in the PRC, 
and what implications this orientation might have for future FLEP. 
Theoretical Framework
This paper adopts a critical historical-structural approach (Tollefson, 1991) to 
examining the sociopolitical contexts and language ideologies that have given rise 
to different FLEP after the founding of the PRC. This analysis is divided into three 
periods characterized by distinct FLEP: I call these the Politicized Era (1949–1976), 
the Reform Era (1978–2002), and the Transition Era (2003–present). The analysis 
of each period includes the repercussions of instrumentalist-oriented FLEP and 
explores an alternative orientation to FLEP.
Before doing a historical account of FLEP in contemporary China, and to assist 
the discussion of the formation and repercussion of FLEP in each period, I will review 
the concept of language ideology, which is one of the driving forces behind language 
policy. The interaction of language ideology with cultural and national identity is 
often elusive (Blommaert, 2006) but is foregrounded in propaganda for FLEP in my 
analysis. To start with, concepts of language belief (Spolsky, 2004), language attitude 
(Ruíz, 1984), and linguistic culture (Schiffman, 2006)have paid attention to the role 
of language ideologies in language planning and policy scholarship. Spolsky (2004) 
broadly defines language ideology as “a speech community’s consensus on what 
value to apply to each of the language variables or named language varieties that 
make up its repertoire” (p. 14), and Ruíz (1984) further specifies three fundamental 
orientations toward language that give rise to various language attitudes: language-
as-problem, language-as-right, and language-as-resource. Ruíz (1984) further posits 
that “orientations determine what is thinkable about language in society” (p. 16), 
be it high or low. In responding to the ineffective measures for minority language 
planning derived from the first two orientations (such as transitional bilingual 
programs), he advocates planning with the orientation of language-as-resource 
in order to mitigate the marginalization of minority languages and the hostile or 
condescending attitudes toward the speakers. 
However, over the past few decades since Ruíz (1984) called for this resource-
oriented approach, many scholars (e.g., Ricento, 2005) have critiqued it on the 
67
ForEigN LaNguagE EducatioN PLaNNiNg iN chiNa siNcE 1949
ground that this orientation suggests an economic explanation, or at least that it 
prompts an exceedingly narrow, instrumentalist interpretation that exacerbates 
social inequality. I find the critique undue. Fishman (1974) pointed out “language 
is certainly an odd kind of resource…precisely because of the difficulty in 
measuring or separating ‘it’ from other resources” (p. 83). Therefore policy 
makers’ narrow definition of language as one particular type of resource (e.g., 
nationalist or economic) does not mean that the language-as-resource approach 
per se is instrumentalist. A policy that promotes a foreign language (e.g., English in 
China) does not always affect people’s daily lives as much and fast as policies that 
promote a second language (e.g., Spanish for indigenous groups in Latin American 
countries, Hornberger, 1988). Even if policy makers selectively prioritize one or 
two of the dimensions of the linguistic resource, this instrumentalist move may 
not receive much resistance from the public, as it does not cause any immediate 
oppression or loss. Instead, the presumed benefits of FLEP, which are usually 
economic, are often foregrounded in national propaganda and echoed by similar 
FLEP in other countries. Therefore, the delayed aftermath of these policies, such as 
deepened social inequality, should not be attributed to the orientation that treats 
languages as resources but to the way these resources are improperly appropriated. 
In responding to the critique of his language-as-resource concept, and in the hope 
of positively informing language planning, Ruíz (2010) leads us to focus on the 
elaboration of a more comprehensive understanding of this orientation, which 
values “cultural, social, political, academic and economic” resources (p. 162). 
Imposing one or two dimensions of a language-as-resource orientation while 
neglecting others may turn the resources into burdens for individuals and for the 
country’s development, as is demonstrated in this paper. Before using the PRC 
case to illustrate this, I will reflect on two fundamental ideologies (Blommaert, 
2006; Kroskrity, 2000) that constitute the launching pad for this seemingly 
irresistible instrumentalist orientation in the PRC’s FLEP: (1) the relationship 
between language forms and culture is ambivalent and they can be separated for 
some purposes; (2) there exists a monolingual nation with a homogeneous culture. 
The Ambivalent Relationship Between Language Forms and Culture 
In the example of FLEP in the Qing Dynasty mentioned above, the 
compromise that was reached between the conservatives and the reformists in 
the Qing government indicates two paradoxical beliefs about language. On the 
one hand, the conservatives were concerned about cultural threat or invasion in 
the process of importing foreign languages, indicating a perception that cultures 
and languages are inextricably intertwined. On the other hand, however, their 
acceptance of applying foreign languages only for practical uses seems to imply 
that they find it possible to separate language from other contextual factors 
(Li et al., 1988). This elusive linguistic paradox did not only affect laymen, 
it has also prompted divergence among generations of linguistics scholars 
in how they interpret their research across diverse ideologies of languages. 
Kroskrity (2000) divides these linguists into two groups: those who adopt a 
formal model and focus on linguistic structure and its referential function, and 
those who adopt a semiotic-functional model and recognize the importance of 
the relationship between language forms and the context of their use. Although 
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the former recognize the “ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, 
religious strictures and all the other cultural ‘baggage’” in linguistic cultures 
(Schiffman, 2006, p. 112), they find them distracting and dismiss them in their 
analyses as the native speaker’s “false consciousness” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 6). 
The latter, however, include in their analyses both the indexical connections 
between language and context, and their value and necessity. 
While the separation of forms and culture seems unproblematic for many 
linguistic scholars, in reality there is no clear-cut boundary. If one assumes that 
the conservatives in the Qing government adopted the idea that forms can be 
separated from culture, since they allowed foreign language learning for access 
to modern science, the fear of cultural invasion seems incongruent. However, the 
question here is not whether language forms are detachable or not, but rather 
whether the decision to exploit linguistic forms as tools is viable in the long run for 
the PRC. In addition, to evaluate a FLEP, it is also crucial to realize that these two 
elusive, paradoxical beliefs about language very often coexist in people’s minds 
and in policies.
The Illusion of the Monolingual Nation and Homogenous Culture
In addition to the tendency to wobble between decontextualized language 
forms and a comprehensive view of language, another fundamental thought that 
makes the instrumentalist orientation possible is what Blommaert (2006) calls 
the “monoglot idealization of the link ‘language-people-country’” (p. 244). In 
the case of the PRC, this would be Chinese people speak Chinese: the one and only 
traditional Chinese culture is built upon this unifying language, and language 
and culture are indispensable in forming national identity. Although fifty-three 
out of the fifty-six recognized ethnic groups in China have their own languages, 
they are not seen as being qualified to represent Chinese identity in many people’s 
minds. Even among the Han—the largest and most multilingual ethnicity—only 
the language of Mandarin Chinese is selected to symbolize national unity (Zhou, 
2000). Though there are so many layers of filtering to do before arriving at this 
monoglot idealization, it is often uncritically accepted. 
This phenomenon is not cultural or recent: Bauman and Briggs (2003) trace 
this language ideology back to John Locke and Johann Herder, two Enlightenment 
philosophers. The former promoted the idea that one particular rational, 
decontextualized language was suitable for a nation’s endeavors for modernity 
while the latter found that one particular folk culture should be considered 
representative of the national character. These two philosophers make salient 
the connection between national identity, language, and culture. Kroskrity 
(2000) critically points out that although Locke highlighted language and Herder 
highlighted culture, both philosophers were defending the interest of their own 
classes. Similarly, in China’s case, Mandarin Chinese and its traditional culture 
have been strategically chosen to represent the nation while minority and regional 
languages are considered to be in a competing relationship with this official 
language. While minority languages are allowed to be taught and preserved, 
the country’s imperative to strengthen national identity has reduced the extent 
to which they are tolerated (Zhou, 2000). China’s monoglot ideology, though it 
does not hold water upon close examination, has sedimented in history through 
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repeated implementations and has fueled problematic nativist and purist language 
ideologies in modern society. 
In the same vein, in foreign language policy making, a nationalist train of 
thought often presumes a one-to-one correspondence between standard language 
and national culture when applied to a foreign country. Though the fallacy in 
this ideology is more easily detected today as people enjoy greater mobility, the 
nationalist arguments are still capable of striking a chord due to longstanding 
monoglot idealization. Ricento (2000) summarizes that “ideologies of language 
are linked to other ideologies that can influence and constrain the development 
of language policies” (p. 4). In this sense, the same language can be deemed both 
the legacy of colonialism and the hallmark of modernity depending on a country’s 
socio-historical context. In the case of the Qing government, foreign languages 
were associated both with the imperialist power that the government wanted 
to resist and with the modernization which it desperately craved. This apparent 
dilemma, based on the unfounded one-to-one correspondence between language, 
culture, and national identity, took for granted that acquiring a foreign language 
posed a threat to native culture.
In order to tease apart these intertwined ideologies and evaluate their impact 
on language policies, Blommaert (1999, as cited in McGroarty, 2010) suggests 
looking at three dimensions: historicity, materialism and verifiable reproducibility. 
In other words, he calls attention to the historical, socio-political environment in 
which ideologies are formulated, disseminated and received. Since making policy 
for foreign language education, especially one designed for the masses, is not 
obligatory for a nation, the decision itself is an intentional planning effort by the 
government for whatever goals might be on their agenda. Similarly, Cooper (1989) 
developed a specific language planning question generated from decision-making 
theory in political science: “Who makes what decisions, why, how, under what 
conditions, and with what effect?” (p. 88) In the following account of FLEP in 
contemporary China, I use Cooper’s question as a heuristic to present a historical 
review foregrounding the power and the ideologies of the CCP at play, as well 
as the repercussions of crafting FLEP with an instrumentalist orientation. The 
following paragraphs will be structured around aspects of this question as a means 
of examining the formulation, implementation, and repercussions of FLEP in the 
PRC across three political periods described below.
FLEP in Contemporary China
Scholars both in China and abroad (e.g., Adamson 2004; Fu 1986; Li & Xu 
2006; Li et al., 1988) have contributed to the field of language policy and planning 
with extensive historical accounts of China’s FLEP from different perspectives and 
with varied demarcation of historical periods. In the following section, I divide the 
historical and the current FLEP into three periods based on the main ideologies 
that govern FLEP in those periods: Politicized Era (1949–1976), Economic Reform 
Era (1978–2002), and Transition Era (2003–present). Ross (1992) eloquently states 
that
[b]ecause foreign language education tests the limits of what is consid-
ered acceptable levels of cooperation with foreign countries, it can be 
viewed as a barometer of China’s modernization trends: registering high 
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when open participation in the global community is perceived to be com-
mensurate with political and economic interests, low when foreign influ-
ence is viewed as threatening to political stability and cultural integrity.
(p. 240)
This metaphor accurately describes the first two periods when FLEP was utterly 
instrumentalist as it was bundled up with political and economic imperatives 
recognized by the CCP government. While the ties have been loosened in the most 
recent period, it is still undetermined as to whether FLEP in China can entirely get 
away from an instrumentalist orientation. 
Politicized Era (1949–1976)
This highly politicized period stemmed from the domestic political imperative 
to strengthen the regime of the communist government and its changing 
diplomatic relations with countries of different political orientation. FLEP in China 
was entangled in political turmoil, with the goals of foreign language education, 
language choice, and textbook production subject to China’s relationship with 
foreign countries, as well as its constant need to strengthen communism and 
prevent the infiltration of capitalism. Foreign languages were still associated with 
the science and technology necessary for nation building, but some were treated 
with caution due to their association with capitalist countries. 
Conditions. After the PRC was founded in 1949, the status of the new ruling 
party, the relatively young CCP, was not stable. It feared any resurgence of other 
political powers that would take over its current position, or at least make it harder 
to focus on nation building. This instability and insecurity were reflected by the 
frequent domestic political movements that swung back and forth between the 
leftists and rightists (Adamson, 2004). For the first few years after the PRC was 
founded (1951–1956), the CCP was active in purging their potential opponents. 
Meanwhile, communism continued to be a political orientation firmly adopted 
by the whole nation; ideological control was tight. A short-lived invitation for 
criticism and different voices from intellectuals was quickly ended by the anti-
rightist movement (1957–1959) that ironically targeted people who had responded 
to the invitation and voiced their critique on the CCP’s governance before. The 
radical ten-year Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) that featured a witch-hunt of 
anti-communists brought education at every level to a halt, undoing any progress 
that had resulted from a few good prior decisions. In short, during the Maoist 
period, political activity was inescapable for anyone in daily life, but it was difficult 
to align with the right side since what was considered politically correct was in 
constant change (Spence, 1982).
The domestic political climate was aggravated by political tension 
internationally. The world was polarized by the Eastern Bloc of communist 
countries and the Western Bloc of capitalist countries. China, ruled by the CCP, 
joined the Eastern Bloc and received financial and technical assistance from the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) while it was subject to an economic 
blockade by the United States. Although China was impoverished at that time, it 
was an adamant upholder of communist beliefs and still assisted other communist 
powers in their civil wars (such as the Vietnam War and the Korean War against the 
United States). However, China’s schism with the USSR in the early 1960s pushed 
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China to expand its diplomatic relations with other countries in the worldby 
sending aid while making more efforts in domestic economic development, despite 
its inexperience. It kept the same command economy inherited from the USSR: 
the central government made all decisions while officials at provincial and lower 
levels had little influence over policy making. This lack of checks and balances 
in the decision-making system put China at a disadvantage, with its decision to 
invest in heavy industry over agriculture finally leading to the largest famine in 
China’s history. 
Actors. Due to the centralized, authoritarian political system, all decisions were 
made by the Ministry of Education within the central government. However, there 
was no specific institution under the ministry designated with the responsibility 
of making policies for foreign language education (Hu, 2001). Therefore, policies 
were very sensitive to changes in the political climate. In addition, there was no 
long-term planning regarding the role of citizens’ foreign language proficiency 
for the nation’s overall development, which could have cushioned the political 
influence. People’s Education Press, directly led by the Ministry of Education, 
was the main publisher that designed and published the textbooks for foreign 
language education. Some areas, such as Shanghai, were allowed to have their 
own textbooks as long as they followed the spirit of the national policies. 
Decisions. During the first seven years after the PRC was founded, Russian was 
needed to access the science and technology that was only available from China’s 
ally, the USSR. Due to sharing the same political orientation, the promotion of 
Russian was not considered an ideological threat. Therefore, Russian was chosen 
over any other foreign language to be included in education, and several working 
conferences and directives were hosted and issued to promote Russian teaching 
(Fu, 1986). English was only tolerated if a school did not have the capacity to offer 
Russian. However, by the mid-1950s, due to the lack of long-term planning, there 
was an overflow of Russian-speaking talents and a lack of speakers of other foreign 
languages, especially English, a language that also provided access to science and 
technology. In response to this, from 1956 to 1957, English curricula for high school 
and middle school were introduced. Due to the schism between China and the 
USSR, Russian fell out of favor while English continued to replace it, carrying 
increasing weight in foreign language education at primary and secondary levels. 
In 1964, the Seven-Year Plan for Foreign Language Education (Li et al., 1988) was 
promulgated, officially spelling out that English was the most important foreign 
language and that the ratio of English to Russian as the choice of foreign language 
education was to be gradually increased. In addition, this plan also included other 
measures to develop foreign language education, but all these potentialities were 
disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. 
Besides the choice of language, the content of the textbooks published by the 
People’s Education Press was highly politicized and consistent with the change 
of political climate in China. Adamson (2004) analyzes the content of English 
textbooks published by People’s Education Press since Series 1 in 1957, scanning 
for political message3, the proportion of which is included and presented in Figure 
1. During 1957–60 and 1966–76, when political movements were at their peak, the 
3 In Adamson (2004), three major categories (political, moral, and nil) and three minor categories (at-
titudes, information, and role model) further differentiating the genres of political messages were used 
to code the content of the textbooks.
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political message in the textbooks exceeded 90% (Adamson, 2004). Even during 
1961–65, when more focus was on economic development so that the nation 
could recover from the deadly famine, the proportion of political message was 
still quite high. The concurrence of the highly politicized English textbooks and 
the political movements is not a mere coincidence. In 1958, Party leaders such as 
Mao were concerned that political transmission in education was not sufficient 
(Adamson, 2004). The Communist government promulgated an educational 
principle emphasizing that “education should be combined with the Proletarian’s 
political, education and working needs” (Fu, 1986, p. 74). The goal of education, 
according to this principle, was for people to be both “red” (politically correct 
and active) and “experts” (high command of subject matter) (Li & Xu, 2006). For 
foreign language education specifically, this goal was translated into an increase of 
political and practical content and a de-emphasis on Western literature for fear of 
capitalist sentiment. The political message in textbooks thus served as a constant 
reminder that a patriotic Chinese person only learns the language forms necessary 
for nation construction and acceptable political activities. English was therefore 
considered a “desirable evil” (Adamson & Morris, 1997, p. 25). Unfortunately, 
however, the need for “red” was usually played to the extreme and the highly 
politicized textbooks (whose content was mainly political propaganda) made the 
need for “experts” in foreign languages impossible.
As discussed earlier, in language policies, language ideologies are often 
intertwined with other ideologies. During the Maoist period, the communist 
government needed foreign languages for nation building, but as a party-state, 
it also feared dissenting political opinion. The former motivated the CCP to set 
up foreign language education which taught language as an isolated tool, and 
the latter reveals their concern that English would introduce undesirable capitalist 
or bourgeois thoughts that would erode people’s minds and the communist 
regime. This reflects the CCP’s deep-seated concerns about the one-to-one link 
of language-culture-national identity, even though languages contain much 
unexplored richness besides native speakers’ political orientation. Thus, foreign 
language education was utilized as the battlefield for the two concerns. The 
political and ideological concern, during this period, took precedence over the 
need for national development, and created highly politicized foreign language 
policies and curricula.
Effects. Due to its hypersensitivity to the political climate, FLEP in China during 
the Politicized period was criticized for problems such as inconsistent availability, 
frequent change in curriculum, and lack of planning to maintain a qualified teaching 
force. While all levels of education struggled during the Politicized Period, Li et al. 
(1988) observe that secondary education suffered the most due to the inconsistent 
availability of resources and frequent curricular changes. Before the mid-1950s, 
the status of Russian as the sole foreign language boosted the expansion of both 
Russian speakers and Russian language teachers, putting other language teachers 
out of work. However, a change of demand in the late 1950s left China with an 
overabundance of Russian teachers and a shortage of English teachers, leading to 
major changes in the foreign language curricula, and even several years where there 
was no foreign language education at all. As shown in Figure 1, the increasingly 
political English curriculum published by People’s Education Press underwent 
three hasty changes from 1957–1960. This frequent change of curriculum and the
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Figure 1
FLEP in the Politicized Era
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lack of teachers meant that the quality of language education was low (Hu, 2001). 
The years leading up to the Cultural Revolution saw five changes to curriculum 
and textbooks, resulting in inconsistent learning for students as none of them 
could finish the series without disruption. Teacher education at the tertiary level 
also experienced the sudden expansion and shrinkage, leaving them unable to 
support the need for language teachers at any level. 
To sum up, at this period, the political imperative imposed on FLEP sacrificed 
the quality of textbooks, teachers, and overall foreign language learning 
experiences for students. More importantly, the available rhetoric fed people with 
politicized understandings of the role, status and functions of a foreign language 
and strengthened the undesirable connotation of capitalism which happened to be 
in opposition to the ideology held by the CCP.
Economic Reform Era (1978–2002)
In this period, the economic interest of the Communist government took center 
stage. However, from time to time, the political interests resurged in different 
forms to remind people of English’s undesirable Western ideologies and cultures 
detested by the CCP. After all, maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP was an on-
going process. In this period, the ability to develop the economy of the nation was 
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just another important indicator of its efficient governance, and economic success 
profoundly consolidated the Party’s legitimacy. 
In terms of foreign language education, English had gradually gained 
supremacy in foreign language education as China opened up and integrated 
into the global economy. English dominance seemed to co-occur with the high-
speed economic development, but it was also accompanied by and exacerbated 
the ever-deepening social inequality. Overall, the policies for foreign language 
education overestimated the need and capacity of English language education in 
China and overemphasized the unproven causality between English proficiency 
and national/individual economic development (Feng, 2009; Hu, 2005; Niu & 
Wolff, 2005; Nunan, 2003). In other words, in this period, foreign language was 
still grounded in an instrumentalist orientation, highlighting its economic value. 
Conditions. The new government led by Deng Xiaoping had learned a lesson 
from the Politicized Period and shifted its focus to economic development with 
the Opening-Up and Reform Policy that gradually geared China towards a market 
economy. The accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 further 
confirmed the trend of opening up and of marketization and made China an 
important link in the global economy. However, the impressive economic growth 
was accompanied by rising inequality: the Gini Coefficient4 in China had risen 
from 0.29 to 0.45 from 1981 to 2001 (Naughton, 2008).
While the booming economy in coastal areas provided adequate infrastructure 
and human resources for foreign language education and the genuine need to 
nurture speakers of foreign languages who were likely to use English in their 
daily life and for commerce, this was not the case in the hinterland. The Hukou 
(Household Registration) System had sharply divided rural and urban people into 
two social classes with different entitlements to social welfare, such as healthcare 
and education (Naughton, 2007). Urban people were privileged with all benefits, 
while those who held a rural Hukou were denied welfare benefits even if they 
migrated to the city. Therefore, rural people either had insufficient resources in 
foreign language education in the countryside or had no access to it in the public 
school system in cities. 
Besides the Hukou System, another significant structural change was the 
decentralization of the decision-making system which was meant to encourage 
governments at lower levels to strive for economic development (Shirk, 1993). In 
exchange for more discretion in economic decisions, local governments needed to 
shoulder the responsibility of managing the distribution of social welfare. However, 
this brought more indeterminacy and regional difference in foreign language 
education based on the capacity and the ideology of the local governments, which 
could exacerbate the existing social inequality.
Apart from structural changes, ideological control, though much lessened, 
resurged from time to time in different forms. In the early 1980s, just a few years 
after the initiation of reform and opening up, a political campaign called Anti-
Spiritual Pollution was carried out to curb both the leftist legacies from the Cultural 
Revolution, and liberal (Western) ideas such as humanism and democracy which 
were at odds with the ideology of the CCP, but inevitably became more accessible 
4  Gini Coefficient is an index that illustrates the inequality in a country based on income distribution. 
It ranges between 0 and 1. 0 represents perfect equality. 1 represents perfect inequality. 0.5 is consid-
ered a high level of inequality. 
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to people after the Opening-Up and Reform Policy. In 2001, the newly released 
Law of the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language (National People’s 
Congress, 2000) stipulated that Mandarin Chinese was the only acceptable medium 
of instruction in educational institutions, and thereby technically outlawed 
bilingual programs in China (Feng, 2009). Although there was no action taken to 
dampen the English fervor under the name of this law, it at least suggested that 
the fundamental role of Chinese as the representation of the national identity and 
culture was officially acknowledged and protected by law. Therefore, whether 
English was going to continue its dominance in China depended not only on its 
overall influence in the world but also on how the government and the people 
in China positioned the language per se, the cultures associated with it, and its 
relationship with Chinese.
 Actors. Three departments in the central government (two departments under 
the Ministry of Education and one committee under the State Council), were set up 
for language planning for Chinese languages. Due to the decentralized education 
administration during this period, the local bureaus of education also had freedom 
to define foreign language education policies regarding testing, curriculum 
development, and textbook production.  However, a lack of systematic long-term 
planning and communication between the departments in the central governent and 
lower levels of education bureaus preluded many problems. Hu and McKay (2012) 
observe that in some regions in China, the promotion of Chinese-English bilingual 
programs or English-medium instruction was initiated by the local governments 
only without checking the feasibility with higher levels of policy makers. At times, 
the Ministry of Education still released mandates regarding foreign language 
education, which were expected to be implemented nationwide even if they were 
not applicable for certain regions. Besides decisions made by formal institutions, 
other implicit policymaking such as using English as a gatekeeper in other sectors in 
society have contributed to the English fervor (Jin & Ding, 2008; Hu & McKay, 2012).
Decisions. Though English was officially recognized as the first foreign 
language in China in the 1960s, Russian learners still accounted for almost half 
of foreign language learners during the Politicized Period (Li & Xu, 2006). Not 
until the Economic Reform Era did English become the truly favored choice 
for foreign language education. The fear of English as an ideological threat had 
weakened significantly and it acquired an unprecedented status and critical role in 
modernization. Each version of the English curriculum introduced and reinforced 
the rationale for English as a tool for economic development (see Figure 2), while 
the availability of Russian and Japanese remained only in some border regions.
The rise of English was greatly facilitated by an education reform initiated in the 
1980s (Hu, 2005) and reemphasized in the 1990s (Hu, 2007) that aimed at providing 
quality education for the enterprise of modernization. This reform affected foreign 
language education at every level. In the 1980s, the weekly instructional time for 
English at primary and secondary levels was made equal to that of Chinese (Hu, 
2005; Hu, 1999), and its high status in China’s exam-oriented secondary schools 
was solidified when it became a main subject (along with Chinese and math) on 
the college entrance exam in 1992.
Despite an overall push for English, a lack of resources limited its presence at 
the primary level until the late 1990s. Hu (2007) traces the expansion of English 
at this level to several education documents that were intended to deepen the
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Figure 2
Role of English Defined in Curricula During the Economic Reform Period
Curriculum Role of English (excerpts from curricula)
Series 6 
in 1978
“English is a very important tool for international class struggle; for 
economic and trade relationships; for cultural, scientific and technological 
exchange; and for the development of international friendship.” 
(Adamson, 2004, p. 135)
Series 7 
in 1986
“A foreign language is an important tool for learning cultural and scientific 
knowledge; to acquire information in different fields from around the 
world; and to develop international communication…. Foreign languages 




“A foreign language is an important tool for making contact with other 
countries and plays an important role in promoting the development of 
the national and world economy, science and culture…. Efforts should be 
made to enable as many people as possible to acquire certain command of 





“Among the development strategies for basic education in many countries, 
English is regarded as a core component of the quality education for 
their citizens and is positioned as a priority…. The status quo of English 
education is not adequate for our country’s needs for economic and 
social development, and remains sub-par compared to the demand of the 
development of our era.” (Ministry of Education, 2003, Preface)
education reform, and to the big push from Vice Prime Minister Li Lanqing, who 
oversaw education from 1993 to 2003. He found the quality and scale of English 
education at primary level were not sufficient for the development of the nation, 
and issued a mandate to make English compulsory beginning in third grade. This 
mandate was meant to be implemented first by cities in 2001 and then by rural 
areas in 2002, but institutional barriers (e.g., Hukou system) kept it from being 
appropriately implemented nationwide.
At the tertiary level, starting from 1979, the Ministry of Education undertook 
a series of planning activities for enhancing college English education which 
included foreign language teacher training, specialized syllabi for different types 
of colleges, and the release of College English Tests (Feng, 2009). The State Council 
also released a tentative regulation for self-funded study abroad in 1981, which 
triggered more interest in learning English in college so as to score high on the Test 
of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) (Hu, 1999). 
There have been great improvements to English textbooks, curricula, and 
pedagogy, as well as a reduction in their explicit political content to less than 5% 
(Adamson, 2004). Since the 1990s, many provinces adopted textbooks that were 
collaboratively written by foreign (e.g., Oxford University Press) and domestic 
presses, with increased emphasis on communicative competence rather than on 
grammar-translation approaches (Hu, 2005). However, the few teacher training 
programs that supported this pedagogic change were of sub-par quality and 
varied greatly by region (Zhang, 2012). 
The diversified curricular content has changed the role of English from a tool 
for political transmission to a way for students to gain more world knowledge and, 
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more importantly, locate themselves in an interconnected world (Orton, 2009). 
Even though there were signs that the government was wary of the disconcerting 
influences tied to English promotion coming to China, its economic value was 
deemed necessary in the push for modernization. However, this instrumentalist 
approach led the government to make hasty decisions promoting this language in 
China for economic interest without a reality check (Hu, 2007). 
Effects. Two important issues must be taken into consideration regarding foreign 
language education quality in the PRC. Firstly, scholars (Hu, 2005; Hu, 2007) have 
called for a comprehensive needs analysis of English in school curriculum before it 
causes more burdens for both students and teachers. This issue subsumes questions 
of necessity, capacity, scale, and age of initial English language instruction. Despite 
the large population of English learners in China, English is still considered a foreign 
language (Pride & Liu, 1988). In rural or remote areas, an English teacher shortage 
continues to be a problem, and the few English resources that are available are 
purely test-oriented (Hu, 2005). The lack of professional support makes it difficult for 
teachers to provide quality education (Yan & He, 2012). Nunan (2003) cautions that 
the trend in Asia to push for an early start in English instruction is not supported by 
research in language learning. However, by overlooking these facts and problems, 
the hasty promotion of English has exacerbated the existing inequality between 
regions, social classes and ethnic groups (Feng, 2009) due to their varied access to 
educational resources both in and out of the public school system. 
Second, it is necessary to reflect on why English is exacerbating social inequality 
in China. Hu (2005) observes that “since China embarked on its modernization 
drive, policy statements and mass media have constructed a discourse that has 
linked national English proficiency and socioeconomic development…. The 
discourse has fundamentally shaped the ethos of Chinese society” (p. 156). The 
discourse is instantiated by using English as a gatekeeper for upward social 
mobility, with high-stakes English tests essentially required for access to and exit 
from universities, for job-hunting and career promotion, and for the chance to go 
abroad. Although these gate-keeping measures are not explicitly written in national 
policy documents, their existence and wide acceptance among people reflects the 
belief that English is a tool for individual success. After all, the co-occurrence 
of China’s rapid economic development and the nation’s promotion of English 
make this connection plausible. In reality, however, most foreign investment in 
mainland China comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau (Chien & Zhao, 
2010; Naughton, 2007). In addition to cheap manual labor, shared cultures and 
languages give the edge to investors from these areas. China’s economic rise is 
hardly associated with English skills. Therefore, the nation’s economic boom is 
related to, but does not result from, the nation’s growing English proficiency, a 
nuance that is often ignored by people who are immersed in English fervor. 
Admittedly, English does play an important role at every front nowadays for 
people who have the authentic need to use it, but English proficiency of learners 
in China is still regarded as low5. Thus, while English learning for self-enrichment 
5 English First, an international English training Institute generated EPI (English Proficiency Index), 
a ranking of the English proficiency of different countries based on the data collected from their free 
online English tests. In this ranking, China is listed in the column of “low proficiency”. Although EPI 
was criticized for its unrepresentative sampling, I find it at least does not inflate the average profi-
ciency of English learners in China since those who have no access to Internet are less likely to have 
access to good resources for English learning. 
78
WPEL VoLumE 30, NumbEr 1
should be encouraged, it is pivotal to realize that the link between English, social 
inequality, and all the roadblocks for upward mobility is perpetuated by people’s 
acquiescence.
Transition Era (2003 and Onward)
This period is demarcated as separate from the preceding era in order to 
highlight the changing perception of English in light of the information revolution. 
This has contributed to new ideologies of English stirring debates at the ground 
level and has also coincided with changing perceptions of English and its 
relationship with Chinese culture and language at the central government level. As 
this is a contemporary period, the effects of decision making in foreign language 
policies are yet to be determined. Therefore, the following discussion is comprised 
of the present sociopolitical context, relevant decisions that have emerged, and a 
discussion about their potential effects.
Conditions. During this period, China has become further engaged in the 
international society. It has held the annual trade fair for ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) in 2004, hosted the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, and held the 
41st World Exposition in Shanghai. All these international events in different fields 
have spawned campaigns for English learning in China’s society, and even people 
working in civil services and public transportation in big cities are required to 
acquire basic communicative English to interact with foreign visitors. At the same 
time, the international society also expects more from China, the most populous 
country and second largest economy in the world, in regard to critical issues 
such as environmental protection, food security, and human rights. The lopsided 
economic reform, the lack of progress in democratization, and severe social 
inequality between regions, social classes, and ethnicities in China have raised 
concerns (e.g., Pei, 2009). The resulting social unrest finally pushed the Hu and 
Wen administration (2002–2012) to focus their work more on equity and harmony 
in society, at least as reflected in their propaganda. Well-intentioned policies 
focusing on the theme of education equity and access were promoted, but whether 
these policies can be translated into reality is still up to the local governments in 
different regions to decide. The most recent Xi and Li administration, while it does 
not intend to end the previous efforts for national stability, has shifted focus back 
to market-oriented economic reform, proposing the idea of the “Chinese Dream” 
to call for confidence in the party’s governance and the country’s future. This term 
is reminiscent of American Dream in that they both paint a promising future to 
inspire the people but differ in how they are manifested in reality (Cui, 2013).
On the ground level during the past decade, due to more affordable 
technological products and access to the Internet, people have found a better 
platform to voice their opinions. Although ideological control and censorship are 
still tight, people have also developed sophisticated skills to protect themselves 
and explore the real Worldwide Web by circumventing the virtual “Great Firewall” 
set up by the Chinese government to prevent access to any reactionary contents 
outside of China. But even within China, people prefer using BBS (Bulletin Board 
System) and microblogs to decry social problems around them in real life. Among 
them, the opposition to English fervor and its threat to Chinese language and 
culture have received increasing exposure. 
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Decisions and effects. The discourse that attributes national economic 
development and individual advancement to high English proficiency has not lost 
its glamour. Private English training and early language education have become 
lucrative industries, but attempts to improve the quality of English teaching 
within the school system are crippled by unprepared teachers. One such attempt 
occurred under the New Curriculum Standards of 2003, in which textbooks were 
revised and more communicative teaching methods were incorporated. However, 
these more communicative abilities are not included on high-stakes tests, and 
these new standards have been significantly compromised by the persistent lack 
of support for teachers (Niu-Cooper, 2012; Wang & Gao, 2008).
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of English fervor, the resistance to English 
and Western culture has risen and expanded from public discourse to policy papers 
in recent years. Gao (2009) observes that in 2006 there was an online campaign to 
reject Christmas, with comments alluding to the spirit of linguistic imperialism, 
and to using English as a self-strengthening tool by “learn(ing) English with 
clenched teeth” (p. 69). As reviewed above, during the feudalist Qing government 
and the Politicized Era, the language-people-country link has also historically 
evoked concern about national and cultural identity when dealing with foreign 
languages. In the same vein, the imagined rival relationship between Chinese 
and English was picked up again by Xuming Wang, the former spokesman of 
the Ministry of Education. He has been very vocal on Sina Microblog regarding 
deemphasizing the role of English. One of his posts reads “#Daily Appeal# …The 
attachment to mother tongue cannot be severed. Cancel English classes in primary 
schools; add classes of traditional Chinese culture; ban the private English training 
classes in society for children; free the children, and save the Chinese language!” 
(Wang, 2013). While the Chinese language, counting Mandarin Chinese alone, has 
the largest number of native speakers in the world, what is endangered for Wang 
is probably the status of Chinese language and traditional culture in people’s 
minds. Of course, cutting English classes in public schools or beyond would not 
automatically promote Chinese culture, nor would it necessarily alter the gate-
keeping role of English for upward mobility.
As part of school reform, however, the Ministry of Education issued ten rules 
for reducing the workload for elementary students, canceling all tests from grades 
1 to 3 and allowing only one in-house school test for Chinese, math, and English 
in each semester for higher grades (Ministry of Education, 2013). Later in the same 
year, the city of Beijing also released its plan to reduce the weight of English and 
increase the weight of Chinese and math in future college entrance exams (Li & 
Gao, 2013). This trend of deemphasizing English was followed by other provinces, 
and some universities have officially announced that they would discontinue their 
local policy that links the College English Test to the college graduation diploma. 
This shift acknowledges the de facto English testing policy, since the Ministry of 
Education has never officially sanctioned any such requirement (Cai & Zhang, 
2013). While the overall trend to sever the links between English and high-stakes 
tests is a step away from an instrumentalist approach to foreign languages, its 
instantiation at local levels are yet to be seen. Because test-oriented education has 
not changed fundamentally in China, the lower weight given to English in the tests 
is at the risk of being interpreted as English not being as important and therefore 
receiving fewer resources. The already low quality of English teaching could be 
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worsened under these circumstances. In a word, what seems an effective policy at 
the macro-level might have quite different results in the classroom. 
For example, Liu, Shirohira, Kvietok, and Laziri (2014) describe a relatively 
developed coastal city in Eastern China where the bureau of education decided to 
simplify the English textbooks due to the growing population of migrant children 
without a local urban Hukou. Many of these migrant children have had limited 
English instruction before migration and it is quite difficult for them to catch up 
with their urban peers and follow the pace of English learning in their new city. 
However, this macro-level decision to simplify the textbooks could be problematic 
since the simplified textbooks and lower standards have the potential to water 
down the overall quality of English education in these public schools. More 
importantly, if that happens, only students from low socioeconomic situations will 
be negatively affected, as they mostly rely on low-cost public school and cannot 
afford the extra resources available for wealthier students. As further explained 
in Liu et al. (2014), the most concerning motive for this decision is the bureau of 
education’s assumption that English is only related to more lucrative employment, 
which is unlikely to be reached by these children. This is a contemporary example 
of a utilitarian and deterministic view of English’s role in the futures of migrant 
children. The removal of English from many high-stakes tests does not alter its 
importance as a critical social resource to help students ultimately find good jobs 
or succeed in business among other opportunities.
In addition to the varying local interpretations of macro-level policies, another 
question arises about the intentions of the CCP in the trend to deemphasize 
English. Minzner (2014) has found that since President Xi took office in 2012, 
party propaganda has been emphasizing the CCP’s work on Chinese traditional 
culture. One example of this is a policy document called National Mid- to Long-
term Reform and Development Planning of Languages (2012–2020) (Ministry of 
Education, 2014a), which was released soon after the Party’s Congress in 2012 to 
show support for Chinese languages. Another example is the many new television 
programs foregrounding language and traditional culture that have been released 
by state television stations in the past two years, including the Chinese Character 
Dictation Competition and the Chinese Idioms Competition. One of the key working 
points for the Ministry of Education in 2014 is to promote the Chinese language 
(Ministry of Education, 2014b). Minzner  (2014) is critical about these moves and 
finds President Xi “is appropriating the mantle of Chinese traditional culture to 
fashion a new image for one-Party rule, and sanitizing official representations of 
socialism to correspond with the economic realities and nationalist enthusiasms of 
recent years” (para. 3). This view sees the de-emphasis of English as just another 
political move in the field of education; if FLEP is an ideological tool that takes 
advantage of the nationalist view, as Minzer (2014) claims, the direction of the 
current trend in FLEP will be subject to many political decisions, similar to what 
occurred during the Politicized Period.
Conclusion
To answer the initial question of whether FLEP at the macro level is inescapably 
instrumentalist, this historical review of the case in the PRC demonstrates that 
much depends on language ideologies held by policymakers and other concurrent 
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ideologies possessed by the ruling class. In the Politicized Period (1949–1976), 
the chosen foreign languages (Russian and English) were both related to access 
to science and technology for modernization because nation building was one 
of the imperatives for a newly founded country. However, the connotations of 
these languages, and the degree to which they agreed with the ruling party’s 
political ideology, made these languages loved and hated at the same time. Being 
perceived as both a tool for modernization and a threat to ideological control, 
foreign languages were eventually distorted into vessels for political transmission. 
In the Economic Reform Era (1978–2002), the political mania was replaced with 
a drive for modernization. English was favored for the economic development 
it was presumed to lead to. English fervor was embraced and fueled by both 
the government and individuals, the former by making policies enabling its 
expansion and the latter by actively participating in this process. However, due 
to institutional barriers, the push for English was entangled in growing social 
inequality, exacerbated by its presence in high-stakes tests. During the past decade, 
after playing the economic catch-up game with Western countries, China has made 
remarkable achievement in its economy, but problems abound in other fields. 
English is commonly considered to be the culprit for Chinese people’s ignoring 
their traditional culture and language. This idea is taken up and promoted by 
nationalists, and emerging policies at the macro level seem to agree with it by 
lowering the weight of English in college entrance exams (Peng, He & Wang, 2013). 
During the three periods described above, each time foreign language education 
worsened social problems or failed altogether, it was due to language being 
treated as a means to an end, highlighting one dimension, rather than as a holistic 
resource with many dimensions. To get away from this instrumentalist orientation, 
it is crucial to create a more diverse and democratic linguistic environment for 
foreign language education at the policy level while involving language learners 
in decision-making for their own education. For the country, providing its citizens 
with foreign language education at the policy level is inevitably strategic. However, 
imposing one particular language on citizens for the purpose of national goals, as 
shown in the first two periods in China, can have severe consequences. For the 
nation to truly treat foreign languages as resources, it is helpful to provide more 
language choice instead of English only in school curriculum, and allocate more 
resources for pre-service and in-service teachers in different languages to make 
foreign language education accessible. For individuals, foreign language learning 
should be a choice rather than an obligation. Linking language acquisition to life 
opportunities strips learners of their agency in deciding whether and which foreign 
language resources are needed for their personal enrichment. In this way, foreign 
language education will also become more prone to political manipulation, which 
will eventually undermine the nation’s development in the long run.
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